Taliban Reject Trump's Call to Surrender Captured U.S. Arms

On 1 March 2025, after his first Cabinet meeting, U.S. President Donald Trump said the Taliban should return the equipment the U.S. abandoned in Afghanistan as it withdrew in August 2021. He added that U.S. troops should return to Bagram air base, which he claimed was occupied by Chinese troops.

This isn’t the first time Trump demanded the return of U.S. equipment.

On the eve of his inauguration in January 2025, Trump declared that future financial assistance to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan would depend on the return of the abandoned U.S. military equipment. (The U.S. Department of Defense estimated that over $7 billion in military equipment was abandoned when U.S. forces evacuated Afghanistan in August 2021. Between October 2021 and December 2024, the U.S. provided over $3.6 billion in assistance to Afghanistan according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.)

In February 2025, the Taliban replied the abandoned weapons were “spoils of war” and would be used against attempts to seize them.

We can safely put aside any talk of U.S. troops returning to Afghanistan, but even if the Taliban agreed to return the abandoned property, how would it happen?

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The U.S. may increase sanctions and promise to reverse them if the Taliban cooperate, but Washington will be loath to make any serious concessions to Kabul, like releasing Afghanistan’s $7 billion of seized foreign exchange reserves, or recognizing the Taliban-controlled government in Kabul.

The U.S. may also stop financial assistance, but that may encourage China to replace the American cash, further solidifying its increasing support for Afghanistan, and demonstrating its ability to marginalize the U.S. in Eurasia. Beijing and Kabul have exchanged ambassadors, and the Taliban envoy was publicly received by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, a clear sign that China recognizes the Taliban government without a formal say-so.  

When U.S. forces were fighting in Afghanistan there were two overland supply routes, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which crossed Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, and a southern route from Pakistan’s Karachi port to the Khyber Pass and Torkham Gate, centuries-old passages to Afghanistan.  

The NDN option is likely unavailable now, unless Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin conclude a grand bargain that will likely be tied to the war in Ukraine, though the Russian leader may not relish the thought that all that gear may wind up in Poland or the Baltic states. Logistically, its do-able, politically, probably not.

And the NDN option will require the cooperation of the Central Asian republics that are busy growing their ties with Afghanistan and may not want to dilute their efforts by facilitating the return of the abandoned property.

The republics are positively disposed to Washington, but they will check with Moscow before they say “yes” to Washington. Though the republics are asserting their own stances on regional issues, they sit between China, Russia, Afghanistan, and Iran and must balance among their four “forever neighbors,” Washington and Brussels which are distant but can inflict economic pain.

The republics may have laws that prohibit or restrict the transfer of military equipment to third parties, so the republics’ executives may have to secure the consent of the legislatures, and there is no guarantee that the outcome of that bargaining will always support U.S. interests. And its no secret where the rail lines are, which will provide excellent opportunities for protesters and activists who are opposed to shipments of military equipment, the republics’ governments, or U.S. policy in general.

The Pakistan route may be available but what will Pakistan’s ruling military attempt to extract for the use of its railways and ports?

U.S.-Pakistan relations are at a low point, as the U.S. recently sanctioned four Pakistani organizations for supporting Islamabad’s ballistic missile program which is developing missiles that could strike beyond the South Asia region and was characterized by the White House as an “emerging threat.” In January 2025, Former Prime Minister Imran Khan was sentenced to 14 years in jail on corruption charges that were widely seen as politically motivated.

Pakistan has suffered increasing terrorist attacks since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, calling into question the ability of the government extend its writ to the violent trial areas bordering Afghanistan. And the U.S. military and security services will recall the warning of a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence sponsored the Haqqani network that attacked U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Will Pakistan demand the U.S. tilt away from India as the price of access? That will be hard for the Americans to do as Trump recently feted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in a White House meeting as a “much better negotiator than me.” The two leaders agreed to work to resolve outstanding trade disputes and double bilateral trade in five years to $500 billion.

The U.S. is India’s biggest trade partner ($119 billion/year), though India is the number 10 trade partner for the U.S. ($129 billion/year.) In contrast, in 2024, the U.S. exported $2.1 billion in goods to Pakistan, and imports were $5.1 billion.

And it is doubtful the U.S. will send Pakistan any weapons that will give it an edge vis-à-vis India, which the U.S. has exclusively designated a "Major Defense Partner," which expedites arms transfers that have totaled $83.6 billion for fiscal years 2022 to 2024. India is buying top of the line gear such as the C-17 military transport aircraft, AH-65 attack helicopters, and the

P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft, all music to Trump’s ears.

And even if the U.S. pledges to destroy the equipment once it gets to Europe, there’s no way to hold it to that. The European nations hosting the destruction facilities (if they even exist) will get a vote on how fast, if ever, that happens as the U.S. military vehicles are treated with a Chemical Agent Resistant Coating, a treatment that contains Volatile Organic Compounds, that are strictly regulated by the European Union and the U.S.

There’s one other route out of Afghanistan that is relatively short and safe: Iran.

Afghanistan and Iran are working to improve relations and move beyond the animosity that is featured in relations between the Islamic Republic and the Taliban. Iran’s foreign minister recently visited Kabul and the two sides pledged to ease tensions and increase security along their porous borders, increase trade (Iran has granted Afghanistan unrestricted access to Chabahar port; the Taliban invested $35 million in Chabahar, signaling it will prefer ports in Iran over those in Pakistan), and come to agreement on sharing water resources (Iran relies on the Helmand River which flows from Afghanistan’s highlands.)

The Taliban may take Trump’s offer-demand and suggest the equipment be delivered via Iranian ports, which are allegedly controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which was been sanctioned by the U.S. as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

The Taliban and the IRGC will then demand the U.S. submit an application for an export license and end-user certificates and an and will pile on the fees for the license, dangerous goods shipments, armed escorts, port fees, etc., etc. It will all be good fun watching the Americans fume and hyperventilate over the prospect of having to ask Tehran and Kabul for permission to do anything, and pay them besides.

What to do?

Pakistan’s military bosses will be willing if the price right, but it may upset relations with India and Trump, who personalizes relations between countries, won’t want to upset Modi especially as he sees a growing economic relationship between Washington and New Delhi. The Central Asian republics will be amenable if Russia is OK with it, and that’s assuming they have no legal prohibitions on the transit of third-party military equipment.

Dealing with Iran may not pbe ossible due to Iranian distrust of anything America proposes, and U.S. domestic opposition to any policy that financially rewards Iran, especially as Israel’s American confederates are agitating for an attack on the Iranian nuclear establishment.

Why not just leave the gear in Afghanistan? The Taliban aren’t using it to invade their neighbors (though it is helping them cement their control of the country) and Washington may make headway in Kabul by providing intelligence that the Taliban can use to neutralize the Islamic State–Khorasan (IS-K) and Al Qaeda. This should find some favor with the Americans as Al Qaeda attacked America on 11 September 2001, killing 2,977; IS-K is responsible for a suicide attack on Kabul airport as U.S. forces were departing, killing 13 American troops and 170 Afghan civilians.

In February 2025, the Taliban declared the Doha Agreement – the U.S.-Taliban peace deal – to no longer be valid as it was limited to a specific set of circumstances, and that Kabul had met its key obligation by preventing the country from being used as a platform for attacks against the U.S. and its allies. That action passed without comment by the Trump administration because…

In March 2025 the Taliban returned an American tourist who went walkabout in the country in September 2022, and Washington lifted the bounties on three top Taliban leaders, including Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani Network that attacked U.S. troops and the ousted Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Though both sides are making positive moves, the Taliban probably have low expectations that the Americans will seize a significant opportunity. In late 2001, Taliban leader Mullah Omar offered his surrender to Hamid Karzai, installed by the Americans as the leader of Afghanistan. The Americans refused the surrender, but the Taliban made several more attempts before retiring to Pakistan to plan the resistance.

And if the Taliban ever decide to negotiate, that payoff will have to be substantial enough to stanch defections to IS-K and Al Qaeda, handing a defeat to the Kabul-based “moderates,” such as Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani (yes, that’s where we are right now), and victory to the hard-liners in Kandahar who will then likely ally with IS-K and Al Qaeda, all but guaranteeing spillover violence (with refugees) to Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asia, and the likelihood IS-K and Al Qaeda will attack the U.S. or its friends.

So, yes, in the interest of peace and stability, the U.S. may have to ensure the Taliban remain intact.

Instability in Iran and Pakistan may be popular with some Beltway Bismarcks, but it will damage economies in the region and disrupt the numerous transport projects that will link Europe and Asia. China, Russia, and Iran will be able to present themselves as the moderating elements compared to the chaos agents from America.

Trump’s best options: noisily pivot away from this topic, quietly pursue confidence-building steps with Kabul, and order the security services to provide the Taliban with information they can use to defeat IS-K and Al-Qaeda.

By James Durso

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